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Illustration, from The Life of David S. Terry, by A. E. Wagstaff, 1892, Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/
details/lifeofdavidsterr00wags, p. 410.

THE LEGACY OF IN RE NEAGLE
Harold J. Krent

F

or generations, commentators have decried the fact that
we live in an era of an imperial presidency. The second President Bush famously (or infamously)
ignored Congress in subjecting suspected terrorists around the world to
military commissions at Guantanamo
Bay and citizens and suspected terrorists alike to warrantless surveillance of their phone calls. President
Barack Obama, like his predecessor,
has used executive power to shape
rules and regulations that Congress
had delegated to subordinates in
agencies as opposed to the President
directly. Both Presidents claimed
broad power to circumvent the Senate’s power to consent to treaties and

appointments. Congress and the
courts have fought back to limit the
scope of presidential power, at least
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a comparable battle over executive power
brewed one hundred and twenty-five
years ago, culminating in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case
questioned the President’s inherent
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a
sitting United States Supreme Court
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted
the potential assailant, David Terry,
and killed him when he thought Justice Field’s life was in danger. California authorities were none too
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pleased given that Terry had been so
prominent in California political life
and that Terry likely was unarmed.
Local officials indicted and then imprisoned Neagle for killing the Californian.
Events leading up to the Supreme
Court decision read like a soap opera,
perhaps revealing more about the
interplay of society and politics than
does the decision itself. The history
of the case starts with David Terry,
who before the Civil War served
on California’s Supreme Court with
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained
notoriety by challenging Senator
Broderick from California, a former friend who was also a friend of
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broderick dead. The dispute centered over
political rivalries, in part due to Terry’s sympathy with the Confederacy.
Terry was acquitted and then left
California to support the South in
the Civil War. After the War, Terry
returned to law practice and politics
in California and, of relevance here,
within twenty years fell within the
orbit of an apparently glamorous but
unstable woman named Sarah Althea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became
the companion of Senator William
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed
great sums from real estate and
mining investments. Sharon, who
was much older than Hill, evidently
sundered relations when he suspected Hill’s designs on his money. Hill
continued to plot how to separate
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Sharon from some of his enormous
wealth. She made a demand on
Sharon for alimony, asserting that
Sharon had married her some three
years earlier when they had started
their “companionship.” In so doing, she presented what likely were
forged documents attesting to the
marriage relationship. Sharon sued
in federal court in California (due
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883
for a declaration that no marriage
had ever taken place. Hill then filed
her own suit in state court in 1884
to demonstrate that the marriage
was valid and requested a share of
Sharon’s property. She hired Terry as
one of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided
the case in Hill’s favor even though
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon
immediately appealed to the California Supreme Court but died before the case was heard. His executor
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit
proceeded slowly, prompting more
aberrant behavior from Hill. She
sported a pistol at many of the proceedings, and waved it at witnesses.
She threatened to have adverse witnesses and their counsel killed. Although Justice Field, by then serving
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not
assigned to preside over the case,
he was assigned as a Justice riding
on circuit to hear several motions
arising out of the case. During one
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort
to maintain decorum ordered that
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found
her in contempt of court. At the end
of the proceedings in 1886, the federal court determined that the marriage was a sham and the documents
forged.
Terry then married Hill, manifesting an intriguing view of the
attorney-client relationship. More
importantly, the marriage placed
pressure on his successors on the
California Supreme Court to uphold
the state court finding that Hill had
been married to Sharon. A divided
California Supreme Court acquiesced, affirming the trial court’s decision that a valid marriage had indeed taken place.
In a complicated procedural
move, the estate then moved to revive
the federal court decree and enjoin
both Hill and Terry from maintaining the validity of the prior marriage,
despite the state court ruling. At
this point, the case was assigned to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Field, sitting by designation. Field
in 1888 determined that Hill had
obtained the marriage documents
through fraud. As he orally delivered
the decision, Hill caused a commotion in the courtroom protesting the
ruling and had to be escorted out.
Terry in a display of chivalry thereupon attacked the marshal for carrying out Field’s order. Field ordered
both Terry, his former associate on
the California Supreme Court, and
Hill imprisoned for contempt of
court. Hill threatened Field’s life and

Terry claimed that Field’s decision had
been bought with Sharon’s money. Terry then sought a pardon from President Grover Cleveland, asserting in
part that Field was retaliating against
him for refusing to throw his support
to Field in a prior presidential primary. Cleveland declined, and Terry
served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently
became even more consumed by
revenge, broadcasting widely his
intent to harm Justice Field. When
Justice Field traveled back west from
Washington, newspapers speculated
on when the confrontation would
occur. Accordingly, President Benjamin Harrison through his Attorney
General assigned Marshal Neagle to
protect Justice Field.

T

he confrontation arose in the
summer of 1889 when Field
traveled by train from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife
boarded the train at a stop along
the way and entered a dining room
in which Justice Field was eating
breakfast. Hill left the room—presumably to gather her pistol from her
chamber—but her husband did not
wait and circled behind Justice Field
and delivered two blows to his head.
Neagle, the marshal, announced his
presence and called on Terry to stop.
Terry made a move as if to draw a
knife that he customarily carried,
and Neagle responded with two
shots from his pistol, killing the
assailant.
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Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.

A local constable arrested Neagle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her
return to San Francisco, swore out a
complaint for murder against both
Field and Neagle. California authorities then arrested Field who was
released under a bond. An eastern
newspaper reported the following
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the
judge.”

Field immediately filed for a writ
of habeas corpus, and the federal
court within a matter of days granted Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice
Field’s stay at the other end of the
courtroom.

Marshal Neagle was not as fortunate—he unquestionably fired
the shots that killed Terry. He filed
a similar writ of habeas corpus from
a California prison, asserting that
he acted within the line of duty in
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was
moved to San Francisco, but remained
behind bars. He argued that, to the extent his actions were undertaken pursuant to federal authority, his conduct
could only be challenged in federal
court. The federal court eventually
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the
writ, reasoning in part that “upon
general, immutable principles, the
power must be necessarily inherent
in the executive department of any
government worthy of the name of
government, to protect itself in all
matters to which its authority extends; and this necessarily involves
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In re Neagle Supreme Court decision, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.

the power to protect all the agency
and instrumentalities necessary to
accomplish the objects and purposes
of government.” The Supreme Court
accepted the case for review at California’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects
the generation-old conflict inherent
in our system of federalism. Some
Californians were resentful that the
federal courts did not respect the
state courts’ determination that a
valid marriage had been entered into
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover,
authorities in California were more
than willing to imprison and indict
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Marshal was following presidential orders. Others in California believed
that California courts should be
trusted to determine whether Neagle’s defense was valid without interference from the federal courts.
Whatever one thinks of the resurgent importance of federalism in our

generation—including petitions for
secession filed in the wake of President Obama’s 2012 victory—few
proponents today would be so bold
as to approve of California’s imprisonment of a U.S. Marshal who
unquestionably was acting pursuant to the President’s orders, not to
mention local authorities’ decision
to arrest Justice Field himself. The
story reminds us that, no matter
how intense regional divides may be
today, they pale before the tensions
between states and the federal government over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case
reveal more—a sordid tale of love
gone awry, reminiscent of politicians’ struggles more recently, from
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on
the aptly named boat “Monkey Business” to President Bill Clinton’s fling
with an intern, and from Wilbur
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs
impact not only political races, but
Supreme Court decisions as well.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997),
was not the first Supreme Court case
on presidential power sparked by
politicians’ sexual misconduct.

T

he doctrinal legacy of In re
Neagle endures. A divided U.S.
Supreme Court, with Justice Field
recusing himself, held that the President enjoys a residuum of authority
under Article II of the Constitution
to take steps to protect the nation
even if those steps are not spelled out
by Congress. In presaging presidential power debates of the last decade,
the Court concluded that the President could rely on powers not directly rooted in the text of the Constitution in safeguarding the country.
The Court explained, “In the view
we take of the Constitution of the
United States, any obligation fairly and properly inferrible from that
instrument” is appropriate, including the duty to protect a Supreme
Court Justice, even in the absence of
explicit congressional authorization.
The Court continued that “it would
be a great reproach to the system
of government of the United States,
declared to be within its sphere sovereign and supreme, if there is to be
found within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful
discharge of their duties, from the
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malice and hatred of those upon
whom their judgments may operate
unfavorably.” Presidents can “infer”
powers from the Constitution—including the duty to protect Justices
from harm. In the case, those nonstatutory or “inferrible” powers displaced California’s authority to try
Neagle for murder and provided
Neagle a complete defense to the
charge. Although the accumulation
of powers and responsibilities over
the last 125 years has radically transformed the presidency, the debate
over the scope of presidential powers
under Article II is not new. There is a
residuum of authority under Article
II—even if the extent remains in bitter dispute—permitting presidents
leeway to ensure protection of the
government and the nation itself. ◆
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